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Felice Batlan 
It was long acceptable to write legal history, even excellent legal history, without including women or gender. Legal historians rationalized that 
because women did not participate in the ostensibly most significant events 
of legal history—the drafting of the Constitution, canonical Supreme 
Court decisions, the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, and the 
jurisprudence that created modern legal thought—they were irrelevant 
when writing “serious” legal history. While women might play a role in a 
social history of the law or in discussions of domestic relations law, on the 
whole, women and gender stood at the periphery of legal history. There is 
a temporal lag, moreover, between the fields of women’s history and legal 
history. What appears new in legal history, for example examining the 
intertwined nature of race, class, and gender, is already well accepted in 
gender and women’s history. Much of this is changing, however, as legal 
historians make conscious efforts to rethink what constitutes legal history 
and its actors. This review considers four very different books that explore 
how gender and race have structured law and the legal profession. Each 
interrogates the legitimacy of law by demonstrating how it has produced 
multiple injustices, thereby challenging the myth that law is about equity 
or fairness, and that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights produced a set 
of inalienable rights and liberties that applied to all. 
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Barbara Welke’s Law and the Borders of Belonging is concise, assignable, 
and packed with insights. She calls her reading across disciplines a “border 
crossing,” as it synthesizes material from extensive historical subfields 
and explores how law has produced and structured inequality (160). Only 
an experienced scholar like Welke, who has been central in reshaping the 
paradigmatic narratives of legal history to include gender and race, could 
produce such a work. Her highly regarded Recasting American Liberty dem-
onstrated how the law’s treatment of accidents stemming from railroads and 
streets cars was gendered and racialized.1 Borders of Belonging is directed 
at a more general readership. It does not produce entirely new knowledge 
on gender and women’s history, but it engages in an indictment of the 
prevailing myths of American legal history and American pluralism: for 
those who were not able-bodied white men, law produced inequality and 
injustice, often leaving women and people of color without legal protection.
Borders narrates a history of legal personhood, pulling no punches as it 
argues that the framing and adoption of the U.S. Constitution created white 
men as legally recognized individuals while women and people of color 
were excluded from such status. Slavery and the common law concept of 
coverture, in which married women’s legal identity was merged into that 
of their husbands, preventing them from owning property, contracting, or 
suing in their own name, were not unfortunate historical accidents. Instead, 
as the primary legal structures for such exclusions, they were central to 
shaping who possessed the bundle of rights and obligations that consti-
tuted citizenship. 
During the long nineteenth century, white men across classes consoli-
dated their power through women’s dependence and property ownership, 
including slaves. The formal roles that white men played as lawyers, judges, 
jurors, legislators, voters, and law enforcers created a shared identity among 
white men and gave them the power to produce law, whether through 
constitutions, legislation, rule-making, interpretations of the common law, 
jury verdicts, or how officials chose to apply laws. Having structured and 
sustained inequality, the law then demanded that redress be sought through 
such legal institutions as the courts, which white men controlled. Violence 
was also sanctioned and legitimized by law, for example the beating and 
maiming of slaves, wife-beating, the murder of Native Americans, immunity 
for those who lynched people of color, or the incarceration of non-whites. 
Crisscrossing time periods and an array of legal topics, Borders creates 
a narrative of historical continuity, demonstrating how legal inequality was 
produced, sustained, and reproduced. Even the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, which could have expanded citizenship and legal personhood to 
white women and people of color, failed to produce such results. Instead, 
federal courts narrowly interpreted the meaning of the Amendments, find-
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ing that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to sex and that racial 
segregation did not violate it. The post-Civil War administrative state further 
bureaucratized and normalized exclusions from full legal personhood; the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs created laws, rules, and procedures to dispossess 
Native Americans of land, and the Bureau of Immigration oversaw increas-
ingly strict immigration policy intended to prevent non-whites from entering 
the country. In Borders, law often appears as raw power cloaked in legitimacy 
and “mask[ing] the breadth and depth of able-bodied white male privilege” 
(96). Exclusions were fundamental to the structure and substance of law in 
the United States and only in the twentieth century would this falter under 
the massive pressure of social movements, whether it be women’s suffrage, 
the civil rights movement, or second-wave feminism.
The other books reviewed here examine how white female and African 
American male and female lawyers sought to dismantle white privilege, 
often functioning as path breakers. Jill Norgren’s Rebels at the Bar uses the 
biographies of nine white women lawyers to explore the battles that women 
waged from the post-Civil War period through the turn of the century to 
become lawyers and to be accepted by the male bar. It illustrates a number 
of Welke’s points in a specific context. Part of what made women’s entry 
into the legal profession so difficult was the diffuse nature of the barriers 
to becoming lawyers: they had to fight separately to be admitted to law 
schools, take individual state bar examinations, be allowed to appear in 
local courts, and be admitted to practice in a variety of federal courts. A 
woman might be admitted to one state’s bar but not another’s, or be al-
lowed to appear in certain courts but refused elsewhere. State and federal 
courts found that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require states to admit 
women to the bar, just as it did not give them the right of suffrage. Male 
lawyers, judges, and legislators used arguments based on coverture to keep 
women from becoming attorneys, even in states where coverture had been 
abolished by statute: if a married woman was without legal personhood, 
how could she represent a client? White men who policed the boundaries 
of the profession clearly understood that women becoming lawyers was a 
step towards becoming legally visible. If a woman lawyer could represent 
others, why could she not represent herself and, therefore, vote, be a juror, 
or hold public office? 
Legal knowledge and fluency in the idiom of law also provided women 
lawyers with tools for dismantling laws that denied them full legal person-
hood with regard to voting rights, entry into the professions, or maintaining 
one’s property after marriage. Some women attorneys came to law already 
committed to women’s equality; other women found themselves drawn 
to first-wave feminism’s agenda as they confronted obstacles to practicing 
their profession. Although Rebels is intended to be inspirational, it also 
Journal of Women’s History158 Winter
demonstrates how early women lawyers had enormous difficulty earning a 
living and how demoralizing this could be. A miniscule number of practices 
were willing to hire women, and, as sole practitioners, they had tremendous 
difficulty attracting clients. Even with formal admission to the bar, women 
did not belong to the larger community of male lawyers. 
Rebels uncovers how, in the absence of paying clients, women invented 
alternative ways of using their legal knowledge, earning a living, and di-
recting their ambition. Some wrote books to teach women the basics of law 
and business; others taught law classes to women in an array of educational 
settings; still others served as counsel to a variety of women’s reform organi-
zations. A number were suffrage leaders, ran for public office, and founded 
organizations for women attorneys. Along with other scholarship on early 
women lawyers, Rebels points to a separate sphere of women’s legal activ-
ity with its own institutions and norms. Future scholarship must further 
elucidate what this sphere looked like, who participated in it, and how it 
differed from the male bar. Norgren, however, makes clear that even while 
participating in this separate sphere, women lawyers sought integration 
into the male bar.
While Rebels excels at recovering early white women lawyers’ lives 
and careers, it does not include the biographies of any African American 
women lawyers or substantively discuss race. Ida Platt, for example, would 
have been an ideal case study. It is crucial, moreover, to understand how 
the whiteness of early women lawyers influenced their identity, politics, 
opportunities, and the institutions that they created. The need to analyze 
race and gender together becomes clear after reading Kenneth Mack’s Rep-
resenting the Race, which examines how primarily male African American 
lawyers from the post-Civil War era through the 1960s were able to represent 
the African American community while simultaneously belonging, at least 
contingently, to an overwhelmingly white male legal community. 
A handful of African American men gained admission to Northern 
state bars in the decades after the Civil War without confronting the legal 
barriers that women lawyers encountered. Once members of the bar, how-
ever, African American men faced many of the same difficulties as white 
women: while they might be formal members of the profession, it did not 
guarantee them a livelihood or provide them access to white professional 
organizations. African American lawyers, most of whom were in solo or 
small firm practices, relied upon attracting African American clients, but 
these clients often turned to white lawyers. With the Great Migration in the 
1920s, this changed as some African American lawyers attracted clients from 
the growing middle-class African American community.
Mack emphasizes the importance of the courtroom to the careers of 
African American male lawyers, which he argues was “open to the crossing 
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of racial boundaries in a way that most other public places were not” (62). 
At least some African American male lawyers established their reputation 
by representing African American defendants charged with crimes against 
whites, and some of these cases took place in the South. Such lawyers’ public 
courtroom performances and victories earned them widespread respect, 
and their presence challenged the whiteness of the Jim Crow courtroom 
filled with white male judges, jurors, and lawyers. Mack astutely observes 
that white and African American lawyers had shared interests regarding 
the projection of the law’s legitimacy and its capacity to provide justice to 
African Americans. African American lawyers assured the African American 
community that trials were fair, that the rule of law existed, and that such 
lawyers were acting as racial representatives. They simultaneously pushed 
judges, attorneys, and court personnel to provide at least procedurally fair 
trials and this in part required treating African American lawyers with 
dignity and respect. Mack emphasizes that within the courtroom, a “cross-
racial” professionalism prevailed (98).
Although gender hums in the background, Mack does not explore fully 
how masculinity allowed for such cross-racial bonding. The women lawyers 
that Norgren examines, moreover, engaged in many of the same strategies 
as the men in Mack’s book, but that did not lead to acceptance or success. 
Clara Foltz and Belva Lockwood did not shy away from the courtroom and 
often won their cases; they understood the importance of publicity as they 
planted stories in newspapers and engaged on the lecture circuit. Their 
acceptance by the bar did not occur, however, and lawyers, judges, court 
personnel, and newspapers viewed their courtroom appearances more as 
spectacle than displays of legal acumen. As Mack explains with regard to a 
later generation of African American women lawyers, their presence in the 
courtroom produced ire and competitiveness from white and black male 
lawyers. Well into the 1960s, the courtesy offered to African American male 
attorneys by lawyers and judges was not extended to women, who were 
primarily confined to office practice, or to juvenile, family, or probate court, 
which did not allow them the experience of lawyering in front of juries. 
Mack provides an in-depth examination of the lives of two women, 
Sadie Alexander and Pauli Murray, making clear that they faced the double 
bind of race and sex discrimination. Mack’s earlier work on Sadie Alexan-
der demonstrated the connections between her public and private life by 
exposing the everyday office practice of a woman lawyer who was also a 
leader in the African American community, thereby deemphasizing the 
courtroom as the consummate site of legal practice.2 In contrast, Representing 
the Race highlights how courtroom jury practice was crucial to the success 
of male civil rights lawyers, and perhaps even lawyers more generally. 
Mack’s framing of success, however, contains gendered assumptions about 
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what constitutes a civil rights case, who is a civil rights lawyer, and what 
success even means. Why was representing a client charged with murder 
more lawyer-like than procuring a divorce for an abused woman in domes-
tic relations court, or fighting for parental rights in juvenile court? When 
we recognize a separate sphere of women’s legal work, we see that many 
women reformers believed the adversarial process failed to create substan-
tive justice. Women reformers, African American and white, worked dur-
ing the first decades of the twentieth century to create family and juvenile 
courts which were not strictly adversarial. Moreover, women lawyers were 
employed by and litigated in such courts and became respected judges. In 
many women’s eyes, working in these courts was not a mark of engaging in 
an inferior legal practice but was part of creating new and superior methods 
of solving disputes and social problems. 
Even with enormous obstacles facing them, some African American 
women lawyers had fulfilling careers with national and even international 
exposure. Sadie Alexander grew her divorce and probate practice to include 
cases involving significant assets, and after being tapped by President Tru-
man, she served upon numerous civil rights commissions. Although largely 
missing from Representing the Race, Constance Baker Motley, an attorney 
with the NAACP who litigated groundbreaking civil rights cases and later 
served as a federal district court judge, probably came closest to having a 
career similar to male civil rights attorneys, but we still await a scholarly 
biography of this complicated figure. 
Over the past decade, Pauli Murray has attracted historians’ attention 
as one of the legal architects of second-wave feminism and as a crucial 
bridge between the women’s movement and the civil rights movement. 
Mack presents Murray as a woman who aspired to represent her race as 
some male civil rights lawyers did, although this never quite happened 
during her lifetime. A biracial person who identified herself as a sex “in-
vert,” she did not perceive herself as having a singular identity (215). She 
was already a civil rights activist when she attended law school and began 
thinking about “Jane Crow”—how sex discrimination also denied women 
“personal autonomy” and basic human rights (233). Mack writes that Mur-
ray’s theory of Jane Crow was built upon her rejection of “conventional 
binaries of identity—black and white, and heterosexual and homosexual 
[which] could not capture her unique experience of moving through the 
world” (215). Murray held a series of unsatisfying jobs, including teaching 
constitutional law in the newly independent Ghana, and working for the 
prestigious Jewish New York law firm of Paul Weiss, an unheard of posi-
tion for an African American woman. Yet in each of these locations, she 
felt hemmed in and alienated. She even scolded her beloved NAACP for 
its failure to include women in top leadership positions. Murray briefly 
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found a home, however, when she was invited to sit on a subcommittee of 
President Kennedy’s Commission on the Status of Women. 
In Serena Mayeri’s Reasoning from Race, Murray plays an integral part 
in feminist legal advocacy and Mayeri writes “no one did more than Mur-
ray to make race-sex analogies the legal currency of feminism” (14). By the 
1960s, as an experienced elder stateswoman, lawyer, and activist, Murray 
brought together an older generation of feminists who favored protective 
labor legislation for women, and younger feminists, white and of color, who 
had pinned their hopes on the Equal Rights Amendment. Mayeri posits 
that Murray’s strategy of using the Fourteenth Amendment to attack sex 
discrimination, which courts had long refused to recognize, allowed for a 
functional analysis of sex discrimination and served to unify the Women’s 
and Civil Rights Movement. 
Like Welke, Mayeri starts from the premise that patriarchy and white 
supremacy were intertwined. She explores the connections between the Civil 
Rights Movement and the Women’s Movement, an important contribution 
because much of the legal history on the Civil Rights Movement does not 
incorporate gender, and the legal history of the Women’s Rights Movement 
is still being written. Reasoning from Race further explores what it meant for 
feminist legal advocates to use race analogies in arguing that sex, like race, 
was a suspect classification under the Fourteenth Amendment, and how 
the construction of such arguments and their deployment in litigation was 
“a fluid, historically variable practice” (5). In the 1960s, feminist lawyers 
saw the analogy between race and sex discrimination as key to convinc-
ing courts that sex discrimination caused serious harm. Some states, for 
example, excluded women from jury service with the rationale that it was 
burdensome to women. Courts viewed this as non-actionable benign dis-
crimination. As cases challenged African American men’s exclusion from 
jury service, however, courts became more aware of the damage that such a 
practice generated and feminist lawyers used this in the context of women’s 
jury service. Feminist lawyers also used the organizational and strategic 
model of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund by litigating highly publicized 
test cases. Legal feminists very much wanted their own Brown v. Board of 
Education which in the context of sex would declare that separate was not 
equal and which would require courts to apply the highest level of scrutiny 
to laws which distinguished between men and women.  
While the other works discussed here are not particularly concerned 
with legal doctrine, Mayeri plays close attention to how courts responded 
to feminists’ arguments and how they failed to recognize the intertwined 
nature of sex and race discrimination. For example, Andrews v. Petty in-
volved an African American woman who challenged a Mississippi school 
board’s refusal to hire unmarried parents to work in its schools, raising 
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issues of race, sexuality, gender, and reproduction. The school board’s 
policy was one more way in which school districts and other employers 
attempted to fight integration. According to Mayeri, “Southern states had 
long used morals regulations as a weapon in defense of white supremacy,” 
the burden of which fell mainly on African American women (146). While 
“young white women who became pregnant out of wedlock were sent to 
homes for unwed mothers and relinquished their children for adoption,” 
no such escape existed for African American women who kept and raised 
their children (147). Civil rights and feminist lawyers rallied to represent 
women subjected to such policies, arguing that they constituted sex and 
race discrimination as well as a violation of women’s reproductive rights. 
Although feminist lawyers hoped that the court would recognize the 
intersection between sex and race discrimination, it decided Andrews v. 
Petty as a simple sex discrimination claim. Other courts would follow this 
pattern, with significant consequences for the evolution of discrimination 
law. Although a woman of color could bring a claim based on race or sex 
discrimination, she could not claim discrimination as a woman of color, 
thereby synthesizing conventional claims of racial and sexual discrimina-
tion. Courts, moreover, continued to apply different legal standards of 
scrutiny for race and sex discrimination. As cases involving women of 
color became part of the jurisprudence of sex discrimination, appellate 
judges focused on the plaintiff’s sex while failing to address the cases’ ra-
cial dimensions. One would never know from reading such opinions that 
an African American plaintiff had brought the case to court, that she had 
made a claim of both race and sex discrimination, or that the case had “its 
roots in the racial justice movements” (167). Mayeri posits that if courts 
had valued such connections, they would have fostered the emergence 
of a more honest jurisprudence addressing the compound discrimination 
that women of color actually faced. This did not happen, however, and 
as the conservative movement grew in the 1980s, many unfairly blamed 
feminist legal advocates for focusing narrowly on white privileged women 
and advocating the most limited kind of legal equality. As Mayeri argues, 
this was the fault of the courts and not of legal feminists who continually 
attempted to create a robust jurisprudence melding sex and race equality. 
These four works complement each other beautifully. Welke provides 
us with a dramatic overview of how law reflected white male able-bodied 
privilege from the founding of the American republic into the twentieth 
century. Primarily through biography, Norgren and Mack allow us to see 
how African American men and women and white women slowly entered 
the legal profession, envisioning not only an integrated bar but also an 
integrated and just society. Mayeri takes us through the women’s move-
ment and demonstrates the potentially radical ways in which feminist 
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lawyers attacked sex and race discrimination, the various coalitions they 
formed, and the legal roadblocks that they faced. Throughout these works, 
we see repeatedly how white men policed the borders of belonging to full 
citizenship and equality. In the end, one is equally struck by how at times 
legal change was dramatic, but at other times it could make inroads only 
in ameliorating the most blatant kinds of legal discrimination. Yet lawyers 
believed that law mattered intensely, that it was something other than raw 
power, and that the master’s tools could dismantle white supremacy and 
patriarchy. 
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